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WILL MOCA LEAVE A BITTER TASTE?
This Note looks at how a new bill entitled the Music Online
Competition Act of 2001 (MOCA) would change the current
Copyright Act with a focus on how the proposed legislation would
limit the ability of copyright owners to negotiate prices for the use
of music recordings on the Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
While many fans of Britney Spears may not know what a vinyl
record is, their parents have seen the format of recorded music
change from vinyl to cassette tape to 8-track and then to CD and
now MP3.1 Music has continued to evolve on the Internet, but not
without a few growing pains. At one point sixty million users
downloaded music for free from Napster.2  Digital downloads
continue to attract headlines, but streaming audio or broadcasting
music over the Internet also attracts fans and controversy.
3
In the last six years, Congress has made several changes to the
Copyright Act to address the use of music on the Internet.4 These
changes have created new rights for the owners of music
recordings. 5 A new bill entitled the Music Online Competition Act
of 2001 ("MOCA") seeks to change the Copyright Act yet again.6
This article will look at how MOCA would change the current
Copyright Act with a focus on how the proposed legislation would
limit the ability of copyright owners to negotiate prices for the use
of music recordings on the Internet. Part I of this essay explains
the recent changes to the Copyright Act. Part II discusses the
1 Howard Siegel, Digital Transmissions and Sound Recording Performance
Rights: The Latest Legal Challenge in Emerging Technologies, Vol. 7. No.
(Winter 1995) NYSBA, 4.
2Penelope Patsuris, Singers to Cash in on Webcasts, Forbes.iom at
http://www.forbes.com/2001/0813music.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2001). Site
is no longer available.3Id.
4 David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part I: On the Absurd Complexity of the
DigitalAudio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 189 (2000).
SId.
6 Music Online Competition Act of 2001, H.R. 2724, 107th Cong. (2001).
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proposed changes by MOCA and the problems it would create.
II. RECENT LEGISLATION
When Congress decided to finally grant public performance
rights to the owners of sound recordings, it could have done so
simply by adding the words "sound recordings" to the list of works
whose owners have the exclusive right of public performance. 7
Instead, they gave birth to an incredibly complex array of
regulations.
8
The Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of
1995 ("DPRA") granted sound recordings a very limited right of
public performance. The copyright owners were only granted the
right to "perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission." 9 To understand this right, one must
understand several definitions. The term digital transmission is
defined as "a transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other
non-analog format. °10 A digital audio transmission is defined as "a
digital transmission as defined in section 101, that embodies the
transmission of a sound recording. This term does not include the
transmission of any audiovisual work."'" The word transmission
is not defined in the Copyright Act but the word transmit is
defined as "[tio 'transmit' a performance or display is to
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or
sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent."'12
The above definitions limit the right only to audio recordings in a
digital format that do not include any audio visual material
received beyond the place they are sent.
The Copyright Act divides digital audio transmissions into two
7 Nimmer, supra note 4 at 189.
8 Id. ('When Congress decided to plug the historical anomaly under which
sound recordings lacked any performance right, it could have acted very simply.
Instead, it gave birth to a Frankenstein").
9 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995).
IO 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
" 17 U.S.C. § 114()(5)(1995).12 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
[Vol. XII:51
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groups, interactive and non-interactive. 13  The main difference
between the two categories for a licensee of music is that only
non-interactive transmissions are eligible for a compulsory
statutory license. An interactive service is defined as "one that
enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a
program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a
transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part
of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient."'
4
In other words, the consumer gets to choose what songs they will
listen to. Interactive services have the greatest potential for
decreasing record companies sales.15  The record companies
receive revenue from the reproduction and distribution of sound
recordings.16 Because interactive services might enable listeners
to substitute on-demand transmissions for CD purchases, the
service must negotiate directly with the copyright owner of the
sound recording.17
For non-interactive services, the Copyright Act provides for a
compulsory statutory license under which the record companies
can be compelled to license the recordings at fees set by a
governmental body.18  The Copyright Act establishes several
conditions with which a service must comply in order to qualify as
non-interactive. The purpose of these conditions is to make sure
that the transmissions have little chance of replacing the sales of
CDs.19 In order to qualify as non-interactive, the service must meet
the following conditions:
The transmission must not be part of an interactive
service;20 the service must not publish an advance
program schedule or prior announcement of the
13 Les Watkins, The Digital Performance Right In Sound Recordings Act of
1995, 13 ABA ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAWYER 4, 19 (1996).
14 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7)(1995).
15 Watkins, supra note 13, at 20.
16 Id.
17 Td.
1s Robert Kohn, KOHN ON MusIc LIcENSING 356 (2d ed. Suppl. 2000).
19 Id.20 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i)(1995).
2002]
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titles of specific sound recordings to be
transmitted;21 the transmission must not be part of
an archived program;22 the service must take no
affirmative steps to cause or induce the making of a
phonorecord by the transmission recipient, and if
possible by the technology used by the service,
limit the ability by the transmission recipient to
make phonorecords of the transmission directly in a
digital format;23 the service must identify in text the
sound recording during, but not before, the time it is
performed, including the title of the sound
recording, the title of the phonorecord embodying
such sound recording, and the featured recording
artist, in a manner to permit it to be displayed to the
transmission recipient; 24 [and] the transmission
must not exceed the sound recording performance
compliment.
25
The sound recording performance compliment requires that within
any three hour period on a particular channel the service must not
use three different selections from any one phonorecord or four
different sound recordings by the same artist or four different
sound recordings from any set or compilation of phonorecords. 26
If a service is not interactive, but is unwilling to meet the above
conditions, then the service does not qualify for the statutory
license and must negotiate directly with the copyright owner of the
sound recordings. This is similar to the licensing of sound
recording for an interactive service, except that this type of use is
subject to a statutory most favored nation clause.27 In order to
21 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(B)(ii)(1995).
2 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(iii)(1995); see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(2)(1995)
(defining "archived program").
23 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(iii)(IV)(vi)(1995).
24 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(iii)(IV)(ix)(1995).
' 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(B)(i)(1995).
26 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(13)(1995).
27 Nimmer, supra note 4 at 252.
[Vol. X11:51
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understand the most favored nation clause, one must first
understand the definition of an affiliated entity.28 The Copyright
Act defines the term "affiliated entity" as an entity engaging in
digital audio transmissions covered by section 106(6), other than
an interactive service, in which the licensor has any direct or
indirect partnership or any ownership interest amounting to five
percent or more of the outstanding voting or non-voting stock.,2 9
With this in mind, one can appreciate the most favored nation
clause, which states:
If the copyright owner of a sound recording licenses
an affiliated entity the right to publicly perform a
sound recording by means of a digital audio
transmission ... the copyright owner shall make the
licensed sound recording available...on no less
favorable terms and conditions to all bona fide
entities that offer similar services.30
The statute has certain exceptions which allow the copyright
owner to set different terms and conditions if there are material
differences in the scope of the license, the particular sound
recordings, the frequency of use, the number of subscribers or the
duration.3' The most favored nation clause was created to promote
competitive licensing.32 The legislative history does not explain
why the most favored nation clause applies so narrowly.33 One
could infer that because the clause only applies to services that are
not interactive, the legislature did not see the need to grant the
copyright owners the same protection.34 Even though these types
of services do not qualify for the statutory license, they still do not
threaten CD sales to the degree that an interactive service does.
28 id.
29 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(1)(1995).
30 17 U.S.C. § 114(h)(1)(1995).
3 1 Id. See also Nimmer, supra note 4 at 252-253.
32 Nimmer, supra note 5 at 252.
33 Id. at 254.
34 Kohn, supra note 18.
2002]
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III. MOCA
"This bill has something for everyone. And it also has
provisions that will give various members of the music industry
heartburn."
35
MOCA proposes six changes to the Copyright Act and
evaluation by the Copyright office and the Department of Justice.36
The evaluation would look at the conditions that a service must
meet in order to qualify for the statutory license.37 Even though
MOCA would not change the conditions one commentator
observed, "[w]hile the inquiry into the effects of these
requirements mandated by MOCA is welcome, it seems to do very
little except lay minimal groundwork for their eventual
alteration. ' '38  Representative Boucher appears to have
predetermined what this study will show. As part of his statement
introducing MOCA, the Congressman said:
Broadcast radio is not subject to these programming
restrictions. Certain digital music services contend
that some of these programming restrictions impose
undue burdens upon their service, reduce their
ability to compete with broadcast radio, and
unfairly preclude their ability to take advantage of
the statutory license to deliver the type of services
35 Chris Cannon, Introductory Statement of Representative Chris Cannon H.R.
2724, the "Music Online Competition Act" (MOCA), at
http://www.house.gov/cannon/press2001/aug03.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2001).
3 6 H.R. 2724, 107th Cong. (2001).
37 H.R. 2724, 107th Cong.§ 7(2001).38 Alexander Davie and Christine Soares, The Music Online Competition Act of
2001: Moderate Change or Radical Reform?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
0031 atpara. 14;
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that consumers expect from a radio offering.39
It appears that Boucher has decided that the ability of digital
music services to obtain the music they want at the price they want
is more important than the rights of copyright owners. A statutory
license usurps the copyright owner's right to exclude others from
using their intellectual property and predetermines the rate they
must charge.40  If the requirements are loosened up, then these
services will become closer to interactive services and the
copyright owners will be unable to maximize the value and fully
protect their property.
The major change that MOCA proposes is to expand the most
favored nation clause to all uses by an affiliated entity.41 The
legislation would change the definition of an affiliated entity to
mean:
An entity, other than an entity that wholly owns or
is wholly owned by the licensor, engaging in digital
audio transmissions...or digital phonorecord
deliveries in which the licensor has any direct or
indirect partnership or any ownership interest
amounting to 5 percent or more of the outstanding
voting or nonvoting stock.42
MOCA would also change the most favored nation clause to
read as follows:
If the copyright owner of a sound recording licenses
39 Rick Boucher, Statement of Congressman Rick Boucher. Introduction of
Music Online Competition Act, at http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/moca-
statement.htm (Aug. 3, 2001).40 Laurie Messerly, "Taking" Away Music Copyrights: Does Compulsory
Licensing of Music on the Internet Violate the Fifth Amendment's Taking
Clause?, Center for Individual Freedom at
http:/lwww.cfif.org/58_2001/Freeline/current free-line-copyright.htm (last
visited Dec. 2, 2001).
41 Davie, supra note 38.42 H.R 2724, 107th Cong.§ 4 (b) (2001).
2002]
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an affiliated entity the right to reproduce the
copyrighted work, to distribute the copyrighted
work to the public by means of a digital
phonorecord delivery or to perform the copyright
work publicly, the copyright owner shall make the
licensed sound recording available on no less
favorable terms and conditions to all bona fide
entities that offer similar services, ...
4 3
The proposed changes would punish copyright owners for owning
as little as five percent of an Internet music service. Their
punishment would be to lose control of what price they can charge
and who they have to sell their intellectual property to.44 As
expanded, the most favored nation clause would affect all uses of
sound recordings on the Internet, including interactive services and
the downloading of music on to a user's computer.
According to Boucher MOCA is trying to protect independent
services.4 5 Boucher explains:
Recording companies have recently entered into the
online music distribution business by establishing
joint ventures with other record companies (e.g.,
MusicNet and Pressplay) and by acquiring well-
known, formerly independent Internet services
(such as CDNow, Emusic and MP3.com). It is
anticipated that the distribution services owned by
record companies will cross license each other, so
that each site will be authorized to distribute over
the Internet approximately 80 percent of all
recorded music. If the major record companies do
not also license independent unaffiliated
distribution services, this could create a competitive
43 id.
44 Messerly, supra note 40.
45 Summary of Music Online Competition Act, at
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imbalance that could threaten the establishment and
survival of independent online music services.
46
If this is his goal, there are other less drastic steps that can be
taken. The U.S. Justice Department is investigating the online
music business 4 7 Until this investigation is complete, it would be
premature to enact legislation for behavior that at this time is only
anticipated.
The policy consideration behind the expansion of the most
favored nation clause is that the government should step in to
increase competition in the Internet music industry, but the
measure has several loopholes.48 The first loophole is that it does
not apply to entities that are solely owned by the licensor.49 Each
record company could create their own music service that would
be solely owned. This would force the consumer to go to multiple
websites to get the music they want and would do nothing to help
the independent music service. Another way around the expansion
of the most favored nation clause would be for the record
companies to charge both their own affiliated services and non-
affiliated services the same high license fee.50 This would not be a
burden to the affiliates because the fees would be going to a
partner of the service who could then reinvest that money into the
company.
Congressman Cannon as part of his introduction of MOCA
stated:
Let me take a moment to respond to criticism we
have already heard from the Recording Industry
Association [of America ("RIAA")] ... RIAA has
46 id.
47 John Geralds, Online Music Under US Investigation, Vnunet.com at
http://www.vnunet.comlNews/1124484 (June 8, 2001). ("US regulators running
the investigation will be examining the record giants' use of copyright and
licensing practices regarding their control of online music distribution").
48 Davie, supra note 38 at para. 9.49 H.R. 2724, 107th Cong.§ 4 (b) (2001).50 Davie, supra note 38 at para 10.
2002]
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said that MOCA contains a compulsory license....
That is just not true.
A number of people did come to us seeking a
compulsory license, but Rick and I felt that would
be premature - especially now that MusicNet and
PressPlay have announced that they will license
downloads to some of their competitors. Should
that change, however, or if other signs of
anticompetitive behavior emerge, I think the
Judiciary Committee would almost certainly have
to consider a compulsory license to address not
only copyright concerns, but antitrust concerns as
well.51
The RIAA opposes MOCA, stating "[t]he bill substitutes
government regulation for the marketplace. 5 2  One pundit has
observed "the attendant regulatory price-setting - is rooted in the
idea of 'market failure,' the perception that it is too difficult for
scattered owners and licensees to agree on terms or gauge
usage." 53 This is not the current state of the industry. Some record
companies may be waiting for the public to have greater access to
broadband Internet services.54 If this is the case, the government
should not step in, but it should allow the market to evolve
naturally.55 Not everyone in the industry is taking a wait and see
attitude, but lobbying for a statutory license may frustrate
voluntary contractual business arrangements.56 The government
should not compel licensing because of a few special interests. If
51 Cannon, supra note 35 (emphasis added).52 Hilary Rosen, Statement by Hilary Rosen on the Cannon Boucher Bill, at
http://www.riaa.com/PR story.cfrn?id=442 (last visited Dec. 2, 2001).53 Wayne Crews, Musical Mandates: Must the Pop Music Industry Submit to
Compulsory Licensing?, CATO at http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-23-01 .htm
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they do, these same parties will be clamoring for forced licenses
for books and movies.57 The government should not force a better
deal for these services than they could negotiate privately.58 As
one commentator remarked, "[I]t's hard to make a case for a right
to be entertained, even in today's advanced welfare state." 59
Ultimately, everyone would be better served by licenses that
reflect the current market incentives, rather than an adversarial
compulsory license designed by a Washington committee.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DPRA granted sound recordings a very limited right to
"perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission. ' 60 Along with that right came a compulsory
statutory license for non-interactive services. 61  If a service is
interactive, or is non-interactive but doesn't meet the conditions
for the statutory license, then the service must negotiate with the
copyright owner.62 The exception to this rule is the most favored
nation clause. This clause requires the licensor to charge the same
rate to independent non-interactive music services as they do to
music services in which they have an ownership or partnership
interest.63 A new bill before Congress, MOCA, would expand the
most favored nation clause to all uses of sound recordings on the
Intemet.64 Rather than interfere, the government should allow the
market to evolve naturally.
Richard Siegmeister, Fordham University School of Law
57 id.
58 Crews, supra note 53.
59 id.
60 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995).
61 Kohn, supra note 18, at 355.
62id.
63 17 U.S.C. § 114(h)(1)(1995).
64 H.R. 2724, 107th Cong. (2001).
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